Context:

Nearly six decades after the Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal, the Maoist movement in India finds itself at a critical position. Under sustained pressure from central and state security forces, the movement is witnessing growing internal divisions and dwindling operational capacity. Union Home Minister Amit Shah has stated the government’s goal of achieving a Naxal-free India by March 2026, reflecting the intensified focus on ending Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in the country.

The Origins and Spread of Naxalism

Naxalism, or Left-Wing Extremism, began in Naxalbari village, West Bengal, on May 18, 1967.

• • • The movement was led by Charu Mazumdar, who penned the eight documents known as the “Historic Eight Documents,” laying the foundation for a protracted revolutionary war.
    • Mazumdar framed the Indian state as a bourgeois institution, criticized mainstream communist parties for “revisionism,” and advocated armed struggle inspired by Mao Zedong’s China and the Cuban revolution.
    • The original Naxalite movement led to a split in the Communist Party of India (Marxist), resulting in the formation of the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969.
    • Although initial uprisings were suppressed, the ideology spread across regions of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, and parts of West Bengal, taking root especially among marginalised and tribal communities.
  • Over the years, the movement evolved, leading to the formation of the People’s War Group (1980) and later, the CPI (Maoist) in 2004, which merged multiple armed factions. Its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), was responsible for attacks on security forces, civilians, infrastructure, and recruitment of children, making it a major internal security threat.
  •  LWE affected 180 districts across 92,000 sq km, forming India’s so-called “Red Corridor.” However, over the last decade, government strategies combining security enforcement, development interventions, and community engagement have significantly reduced the reach and influence of the movement.

Current Status of Naxalism in India:

• • The Maoist movement is now facing a leadership crisis. Several top leaders, including former General Secretary Nambala Keshav Rao alias Basavaraj, and Central Committee members such as Katta Ramachandra Reddy, Kadari Satyanarayana Reddy, Gajarla Ravi, Chalpathi, Sahdev Soren, Balkrishna, Narasimha, and Chalam, have been killed in recent operations. Many armed cadres have also been neutralized, leaving the organization fragmented.
  • The remaining Maoist pockets are concentrated in Bastar, Dandakaranya, and the Chhattisgarh-Telangana border, where they face shortages of arms and ammunition due to large seizures by security forces.
  • Recruitment has also declined sharply: while earlier the movement drew cadres from both tribal and non-tribal populations, today tribal youth show little interest in joining an armed guerrilla struggle. Government welfare schemes, free education, and increased exposure to mobile and internet connectivity have offered alternatives to insurgency.
  • Health and age issues among the remaining senior leaders have further weakened operational capacity. Many consider surrender and retirement under government rehabilitation schemes a viable option. The wives and partners of several top leaders have already surrendered.

Government Strategy against LWE:

India’s strategy against Left Wing Extremism combines three pillars: security enforcement, development intervention, and community engagement.

1. Security Measures

The government’s SAMADHAN doctrine provides a comprehensive framework for counter-insurgency, including:

• • • Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and India Reserve (IR) battalions.
    • Modernisation of state police forces, including training, arms, and communication upgrades.
    • Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) to strengthen intelligence units, fortified police stations, and Special Forces.
    • Financial Crackdown through the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) to target funding channels, including extortion and hawala networks.

Elite units such as Greyhounds (Telangana) and C-60 (Maharashtra) have enhanced intelligence-driven operations, focusing on precise action rather than broad-area patrolling.

2. Development and Welfare Interventions

Recognizing that socio-economic deprivation drives insurgency, the government has implemented targeted programs in LWE-affected areas:

• • • Special Central Assistance (SCA) to address critical infrastructure gaps in roads, schools, health facilities, and water supply.
    • Financial inclusion initiatives including bank branches, ATMs, and banking correspondents in remote villages.
    • Skill development and education programs, including new ITIs, Skill Development Centres, and Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) for tribal students.
    • The Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan, providing basic amenities, livelihood support, and infrastructure development.
    • Focus on 3-C connectivity: roads, mobile network coverage, and financial access.

These interventions have altered the socio-economic landscape, offering tribal youth alternatives to joining armed movements.

3. Community Engagement and Perception Management

The Civic Action Programme (CAP) aims to humanize security forces and build local trust through social outreach, including health camps, school support, and community events.

A coordinated Media and Perception Management Plan counters Maoist propaganda, highlights government initiatives, and increases youth aspirations. Such efforts are designed to make the benefits of peace tangible while weakening the insurgents’ ideological appeal.

4. Rehabilitation and Surrender Programs

Several surrendered cadres have been reintegrated through government programs offering financial support, skill training, and employment opportunities, signaling a viable alternative to insurgency.

Persistent Challenges:

• • Ideological appeal: The Maoist narrative still glorifies armed struggle and revolutionary justice.
  • Difficult terrain: Dense forests, hills, and remote villages complicate counter-insurgency operations.
  • Trust deficit: Historical neglect and displacement from development projects contribute to continued suspicion of state motives.
  • Front organizations and alliances: Urban and external networks continue to support recruitment, propaganda, and funding, sometimes with cross-border linkages.

Way Forward

1.       Bridging the Trust Deficit

o    Enhance tribal participation in local administration.

o    Implement Forest Rights Act, 2006, empowering communities over minor forest produce.

o    Follow Bandyopadhyay Committee recommendations on tribal-sensitive land acquisition and rehabilitation policies.

2.      Sustaining Development Gains

o    Continue focus on livelihoods, education, healthcare, and digital access.

o    Ensure schemes reach remote areas and benefit the most marginalized.

3.      Countering Ideological Appeal

o    Promote democratic participation and constitutional rights.

o    Utilize surrendered cadres to act as peace ambassadors and mentors for local youth.

4.     Security and Coordination

o    Strengthen intelligence-driven policing and elite counter-insurgency units.

o    Enhance Centre-state coordination for timely operations and holistic development measures.

Conclusion:

The Naxalite-Maoist movement, which began as an armed struggle against feudal exploitation, is now in decline due to a combination of security pressure, leadership losses, and socio-economic changes. Government initiatives combining law enforcement, development, and community engagement have significantly reduced the reach of the insurgency. However, challenges remain. Successful elimination of Naxalism requires not just military operations but sustained efforts in trust-building, governance, and empowerment. Only by addressing the root causes of insurgency, including poverty, marginalization, and social exclusion, can the state ensure a lasting peace and prevent the resurgence of armed rebellion.

The journey from Naxalbari to today illustrates that security alone cannot defeat insurgency; inclusive development, citizen engagement, and promotion of constitutional values are equally essential. Achieving a Naxal-free India will signify not only a strategic victory but also the realization of equitable development and social justice for marginalized communities.